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Today, new insights into the voluntary and involuntary participation of individual per-
sons in biotic masses, ecological ensembles, and technological practices all create a need 
to redefine human subjectivations. Today, we presume that we, humans, stand and have 
always stood in relationships of interpenetration – generally unconscious, unreflected 
relationships with languages, images, sensory technologies, social and ecological sur-
roundings – that question the traditional understanding of human identity and the as-
sumption of the indivisibility and autonomy of the person/subject. They also question 
the epistemological differentiation of biological species, the demarcation of nations and 
cultures, and, ultimately, the defining of artworks as self-contained entities. Since we are 
ineluctably linked with bio- and socio(techno)logical processes insofar as they cannot be 
separated from us without endangering our further existence and our psychophysical 
consistency, we find ourselves faced with the task of considering, affirming, and moder-
ating our (often contradictory) participations. The increased insight into qualitatively 
different forms of participation that produce new subjectivations force us to rethink our 
self-understanding in terms of ‘the individual.’ The fact that we today recognise that our 
existence is based on varied, material and immaterial, types of participation, demanding 
a multidirectional orientation of our attention and the development of mental and affec-
tive competencies that empower us to be what is known as ‘human persons,’ is some-
thing that we may judge either as a gain or an excessive burden. We recognise that our 
self-identity as ‘individual,’ as undivided entity, expresses a misleading negation of nec-
essary, life-constituting participation and that, as a Latin translation of the Greek ‘atom,’ 
it is as untenable as the now discredited assumption that the atom is indivisible. Instead, 
we should learn to acknowledge that undividedness – and subdividedness – is a ques-
tion of the scale of our modes of observation, and that everything our eyes perceive as 
complete and undivided only reflects a mode of human perception, with limited validity.  
 Not least, we have to understand that the term ‘individual’ – once used in the search 
for the universe’s smallest physical building blocks – did not come to mean the single 
human person until the late seventeenth century, and thus is coupled with certain his-
torical circumstances. From that point on, it was used for the theoretical-political devel-
opment and promotion of the bourgeois single person, who increasingly had to repre-
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sent the definitive model of humanity – as a socio-political actor, as owner of property 
and land, of one’s own abilities, and as an independent business manager. Due to the 
central position of the human individual in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the lib-
eral self-ruler who orders the world according to his abilities and desires is even praised 
as that genius that prescribes laws for nature. Since today we can recognise that promot-
ing this theoretical-political operator was in the interests not only of bourgeois emanci-
pation, but also of the emergence of the nation state (including its identitarian culture 
and imperialistic expansion) it appears urgently necessary to examine it under contem-
porary epistemic-political conditions. Not only from a (post)colonial perspective, this 
understanding of the individual is criticised today for its universalising as well as re-
strictive epistemic force; in response to the codification of human rights in the UN char-
ter, even regional declarations of human rights refer to different, more community-
related understandings of the person. 
 The interwovenness of the human existence with countless (and often non-human) 
others increases the difficulty of deciding where the boundary lies between single per-
sons and others, between causation by others and by oneself. It also makes clear that it 
is not only human subjectivations for which the designation ‘individual’ is inappropriate. 
Thanks to ever-improving observational data on interdependencies between bio- and 
socio(techno)logical processes, and thanks to the perception of their inseparability, we 
also recognise that single organisms in general can only be investigated alone and ‘in 
themselves’ through artificial isolation, and that the epistemological detaching of social 
ensembles and specific cultures serves specific epistemic power interests. Singling out, 
isolation, individuation always reveal themselves to be part of strategies of privileging 
and hierarchisation, which, because they reduce complexity, prove to be invalid for di-
agnosing contemporary human subjectivations and changing relationships in globalised 
societies. 
 
The ‘dividual’ in Deleuze’s philosophy 
In his brief “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” Deleuze draws attention to the flexi-
bilisation of human and non-human single entities under the post-analogue regime of 
visibility and control, the compulsion to engage in lifelong learning, the substitution of 
the human signature by machine codes, the way in which previously self-enclosed en-
sembles now adjust to one another in real time, and the targeted modulation of such 
adjustment. To a greater extent than Deleuze could have foreseen, single persons are 
today finding themselves subject to a continuous movement of liquefaction and ‘dividua-
tion,’ as I would like to call it. The fact that single persons are placed in a relationship to 
abstract and non-personal powers of control and computing systems, that they are reg-
istered, directed, and intricately lent enhanced value by them, causes Deleuze to speak of 
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new modes of subjectivation: “We’re no longer dealing with a duality of mass and indi-
vidual. Individuals become ‘dividuals’ and masses become samples, data, markets, or 
‘banks’.” (1992: 5) In this late text, he adopts a gloomy outlook, sketching the process of 
becoming-dividual as resulting from the registering of single persons and whole popula-
tions by privatised and economicised regimes of recording and allocation, and by the 
compulsion to become fluid, following the model of stock prices and currency devalua-
tions. Single persons appear dividuated due to their reduction to statistical values, the 
compulsion to participate at all times, and the modularising of their abilities and per-
formances according to a given set of requirements, in a process of ‘distortion’ of what 
an individual was previously supposed to be.   
 By contrast, in his cinema books, Deleuze outlines a positive understanding of the 
dividual. Speaking of what determines filmic framing, in particular of the ‘affection im-
age’ (2001: 102), he argues that the width and mobility of framings modify the captured 
and framed aesthetic ‘ensemble’ and thus, always, the expression of the image; the au-
tonomous soundtrack also changes the atmosphere and affect value of single shots and 
the whole film, and they continually divide aesthetically in different ways. In its ana-
logue form, it is characterised as an audiovisual interchange between virtual and actual 
conditions and, all in all, as dividual articulation: “Here, it is by degrees of mixing that 
the parts become distinct or confused in a continual transformation of values. The set 
cannot divide into parts without qualitatively changing each time.” (Deleuze 2001: 14) 
Like human subjectivation, it is held together by immanent repetition and affection, 
through their narrative symbolism and reflexion. As with human subjectivation, the 
dividual aspect in the artwork places the accent on inner variability, elasticity, and con-
tinual reorganisation of the aesthetic elements, on the necessary readjustment of partic-
ipation, on time-dependent aesthetic re-divisions, on differences in intensity and light 
and sound divergences, which elude any simple registration: “parts which do not have 
the same denominator of distance, relief or light. In all these senses the frame ensures a 
deterritorialisation of the image.” (2001: 15) The filmic ensemble manifests itself as a 
dividual and particular assemblage of becoming, lending itself a special affective expres-
sion depending upon the affirmed and selected actualisation of the virtual. 
 Deleuze calls ‘dividual’ the expression of contemporary aesthetic heterogeneses, 
particularly in cinematic and musical artworks. He denies that their temporally deter-
mined multiplication of visual and auditory signs, sounds or voices (a multiplication that 
occurs within temporally shifting frameworks) displays a definable individuality: they 
represent nothing measurable or clearly determinate, are not “divisible or indivisible, 
but ‘dividual.’” (2001: 14) Filmic unfolding in time – its constantly changing image and 
sound composition – cannot be called individual, as it never crystallises lastingly into an 
expression that can be established and characterised unambiguously, especially in its 
digital computation process. Deleuze nevertheless sees the semiotic ensembles as con-
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gealing into a particular, even singular expression: “The affect is impersonal and is dis-
tinct from every individuated state of things; it is nonetheless singular and can enter into 
singular combinations or conjunctions with other affects.” (2001: 98) It seems important 
to him to emphasise that in spite of emerging from a variety of aesthetic factors, the ex-
pression of affect is indivisible; the new qualities it constitutes are affectively indivisible 
and at the same time aesthetically divided; therefore Deleuze calls them dividual. He 
conceptualises the dividual as an aesthetic differentiality, or, as it were, an undivided 
dividedness. This undivided dividedness, which is distinct from a notion of individual 
indivisibility by virtue of its immanent variability and interwovenness with others, is 
also attributed, by Deleuze and Guattari, to certain musical compositions, such as those 
of Luciano Berio, where tones are made to resound in a “multiple cry, a cry of the popu-
lation, in the dividual of the One-Crowd.” (Deleuze/Guattari 2008: 377) 
 The concept of the dividual developed by Deleuze in an ambivalent sense serves 
here as an impulse for further reflections on actual human subjectivations, but also on 
all sorts of organic and symbolic entities which up to today have been considered undi-
vided and indivisible. Taking Deleuze’s expositions and evaluations further, I intend to 
emphasise that the term dividuation today exhibits its contrariness and contradictori-
ness even more strongly. After all, it must be conceived as a highly ambivalent processu-
ality, resulting, on the one hand, from the participatory affirmations of the present and 
the multidirectional interweaving of single persons into new collective formations with 
a precarious coherence, and, on the other hand, from involuntary co-optations and as-
signments through statistical recording strategies and other participation constraints. 
By extending the concept of the dividual and using the term ‘dividuation’ I want to ac-
centuate (more strongly than Deleuze did) that persons have never been individuals or 
individuations; because of our increasing insight into the erroneous character of this 
self-description, I propose a change of terminology. We should conceive of ourselves no 
longer as individuals, but as intersections of different modes of voluntary and involun-
tary participation, as a metastable coherence in accordance with our rhythmic and psy-
chophysical capabilities. Isn’t the corona crisis an illustrative example of (in)voluntary 
participation on different levels? Humans have to realise that they are de-individuated 
by a universalised danger and all equally exposed to a life-threatening viral infection. 
They become dividuated not only by similar psychological reactions, but by enforced 
political control and security measures, health prescriptions, shut-down regulations, or 
even digital surveillance, but also by increased internet activities, the need to rely on 
each other, and so forth. 
 The insight into human intersectionality is of course not limited to human subjecti-
vations, but concerns all temporally (un)determined entities. Only if we learn to under-
stand that each single entity which up to now has been classified as an individual should 
be considered as a specific and necessary dividuation will we gain a deeper insight into 
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the complexity of bio- and socio(techno)logical processes. Thanks to improved micro-
insights, we can today recognise our microstructural dividuatedness, our dependence on 
nonhuman others – such as bacteria and viruses – but also the lengthy genesis we share 
with them. The same is true of our embeddedness in the socio-technological field. 
 Due to these insights, the position of those designated as ‘other’ is called into ques-
tion as well. What is conventionally classified as different now appears not to be differ-
ent in every respect: for instance, we share a large percentage of our genetic information 
with nonhuman organisms, and nonhuman agents are active in the decoding of our ge-
nome. Technologically supported language and image communications co-model our 
self-image and language behaviour, our imaginations, and our psychophysical consisten-
cy. They take on research functions previously considered integral to humans, respond 
to interests by offering products to purchase, stimulate perception with semiotic infor-
mation, and aid orientation in space and time in the lived world. From digital communi-
cation, they extract risks represented by the person; they assign humans to certain prob-
lem groups, forestall vulnerabilities by offering preventative measures, and thus may 
influence longevity. Glad to be rid of the challenges of self-management, we allow our-
selves to be helped, outsourcing our capacities, becoming more similar in the minimal 
activity of clicks, reducing our communicative competence to exchanging short messag-
es, and integrating ourselves into virtual social assemblies. These practices alone should 
convince us to understand ourselves as participation-obsessed and as virtuosos of self-
division, as divided by – and partaking in – countless others, being necessarily co-
embedded in unknown assemblages. 
 
Philosophies of (de-)individualisation 
In a related sense, Michel Foucault, in his preface to the US edition of Anti-Oedipus, out-
lines desirable group formations that he calls a “generator of de-individualization.” 
(Deleuze/Guattari 2004: xvi) This demand imposed on human subjectivations and social 
formations alike – that of being not individual and at the same time particular, both open 
and delimitable – constitutes the ultimate challenge today, both for single humans and 
their symbolic practices, and for cultures and societies. For how is one to lastingly suc-
ceed in uniting the modes of decentred pluri-participation into a structure that is both 
mobile and coherent, and which, moreover, achieves for itself as singular an expression 
as possible? It seems to me that since modes of participation are shared with many oth-
ers, it would make more sense to consider that which articulates itself not as a singular 
and unique, but as a different expression, one with its own special profile and tone (for 
instance, a particular quantity rather than a unique identity).  
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 Alfred North Whitehead attempts to conceptualise such relations of participation 
when he insists on situating ‘atomic’ single beings within a ‘divisibility’ (1929: 321) 
whose actual division they can bring about, and which guarantees them undividedness 
and divisibility at one and the same time. Both “one” and “definitely complex” (321), 
they are “united by the various allied relationships of whole to part, and of overlapping 
so as to possess common parts” (91). As complex units, they then provide each of their 
components with “a real diversity of status,” that is, with a reality that is “peculiar” (322) 
to them. Prior to the reflections outlined here, Whitehead assumes different participa-
tions and subdivisions proper to single entities; this is why he attributes to them “sub-
jective unity,” “objective identity” and “objective diversity” (321), all at once. Because of 
their objective diversity, referring to them as ‘atomic’ seems to me to be inappropriate, 
all the more so as Whitehead emphasises that “[t]here are always entities beyond enti-
ties, because nonentity is no boundary” (91-92). It would seem more consistent to con-
ceptualise them as processes of variously rhythmatised and qualitatively diverse partic-
ipation that are nevertheless “more than a mere collective disjunction of component el-
ements” (323). Their psychophysical coherence, autopoeietic dynamic, and vital expres-
sion fuse them into a specifically complex unity with a particular aesthetic profile. 
 The concept of dividuation is also to be understood as the continuation and becom-
ing-more-acute of that which Gilbert Simondon understood to be human ‘individuation’ 
(1964). He shifted the accent from focusing on autonomous individuals to focusing on 
complex and problematic individuation processes of the single person and the associat-
ed necessary and precarious integration. Previously, Spinoza, in his Ethics (1999), 
thought of the human body as “composed of a great number of complex individual parts” 
(II, LS15), composed of solid, fluid, and gaseous individuals, and as furthermore affected 
by external bodies. The human body appears here as a dynamic composite of multiply 
affected individuals which “stands in need for his preservation of a number of other bod-
ies, by which it is continually, so to speak, regenerated.” (II, Postulate 4) Similarly, Si-
mondon criticises the ‘conclusive’ and reductive concept of the individual as resting on 
false ontological premises, such as atomistic substantialism or Aristotelian hylo-
morphism. He views atomism as a conception unsuited to describing vital temporal pro-
cesses and ontogeneses because it concerns itself only with fundamental physical units 
and their connection, and ties cohesive forces to elementary particles. Simondon, on the 
other hand, understands human individuation as the result of qualitatively diverse, over-
lapping, awkwardly spliced, and high-tension processes, which, critical for the purpose 
of this article, can only be synthesised into a single entity through elastic cohesion forces 
and permeable immunisations. This synthesising brings with it a merely ‘metastable’ 
state, in which the partial individuations progressively shift; they must balance their 
‘incompatibility’ relative to each other and recombine.  
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 In order to be able to develop in the first place, the single entity must bring together 
within itself qualitatively different operations and, to join them, must have in reserve the 
‘addition operation’ of the psyche. Simondon defines individuation as a multilayered and 
non-concluding process, where physical and vital individuation provides a ‘pedestal’ for 
psychic individuation. Through elastic binding and regeneration and reproduction forc-
es, individual entities are lent a certain cohesion, duration, and possibility of self-
reflection, creating autopoietic capacities such as impulsiveness, affectability, and intel-
lection. In their oblique and phase-dependent interconnection, these are said to take the 
single persons beyond themselves and into real associations with others. Every succeed-
ing individuation is said to depend upon the successful integration of new individua-
tions: in view of this, why did Simondon not use the concept of dividuation? After all, his 
further definitions also imply time-dependent dividual relationships. In fact, he explicitly 
mentions the dangers of conclusion connected with the individual. Since the different 
individuations actualise themselves non-simultaneously, the single entity is never com-
pletely realised. Instead, it must continually battle to balance out its affective polarities 
and to harmonise its contrary needs for differentiation and integration. Simondon sees 
this conflictual constitution as the defining expression of viability, since an individual 
that responds exclusively to itself and is closed to external forces cannot reach beyond 
the boundaries of its fear – a statement possibly intended to distance himself from 
Freud’s and Heidegger’s definition of fear as a basic affect or as a mood that is funda-
mental to existentialist essentialising.  
 Simondon sees individuations that can shift in relation to each other as founded in 
processes he calls ‘pre-individual.’ These ontogenetically co-constitute the single person 
and are co-responsible for the person’s inner unrest and mobility – perhaps analogous 
to Freud’s understanding of the unconscious. Owing to their genesis in these pre-
individual multiplicities, single persons are forced to affirmatively repeat this originary 
differentiality, for the purpose of which they must acquire a psychic dimension. Since 
others also participate in these pre-individual realities, they inevitably harmonise with 
others in a ‘trans-individual’ problematics: “Entrance into psychic reality signifies en-
trance into a transitional stage, as solving the intra-individual psychic problematics […] 
takes one to the trans-individual level.” (Simondon 1964: 154)1 Human individuations 
find themselves bound to others in pre-individual participation, compelling intra-
individual problem solutions and enabling their trans-individual orientation: just as 
psychic individuation stands in a ‘reciprocal’ relationship to the collective, so do the ‘in-
ner’ individuations to the ‘external’ ones. Simondon accords single persons, who transfer 
their transindividual orientation into real group formations, an “individuation in collec-
tive unity.” (Simondon 1964: 154) Individuation is thus an event multiply shared with 
others, from a virtual starting point in the pre-individual to a potential transindividual 
                                                        
1 All translations by Alice Kirkland. 
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actualisation as sociality. For this reason, they tend to orient themselves multidirection-
ally, engaging in diverse or even incompatible participations and coming together in col-
lectives and condividuations. Thus, in my opinion, these mobile individuations would be 
better described as dividuations, since their problematics are greater than their own 
‘being,’ causing lateral connection with others. Today, these individuations are trans-
forming themselves into inherently mobile and still more precarious dividuations in the 
effort to join together their vital, physical, and psychic individuations as distinguished by 
Simondon.  
 In Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Simondon 1969), the ‘trans-individual’ 
world proceeds from the technological connectivity aspect of individuations, from their 
invention and construction operations, and the use, regulation, and improvement of ma-
chines. Trans-individuality “produces a connection between the invention and organisa-
tion capacities of multiple subjects. There is a reciprocal causality and occasioning rela-
tionship between the existence of the separated, non-alienated technical objects, which 
are deployed in a non-alienated mode, and the constitution of such a trans-individual 
relation.” (Simondon 1969: 253) Under the heading of the trans-individual, he now 
sketches couplings of single entities via divided technical capacities and cultural tech-
niques or – particularly apt in today’s context – via technological communication that 
interconnects them. They lean upon one another, and, in the best case, come together in 
a higher capacity for the exchange of information, for generalised affect and intellect. 
Since single persons are diverse in their participations and, being co-constituted as di-
verse entities, never operate as undivided, I conceptualise them as dividuations. Thus, I 
would say that they do not participate merely in a single trans-(in)dividual, but are vari-
ously transdividually passivised and activated, and come together to form diverse con-
dividuations that are, in the best case, self-reflexive and resilient.  
 The technological dispositifs, however, set up their own trans-dividual group pro-
files, insofar as they filter out and compile specified types from the recorded data that 
are of interest because of their expressive or interconnective behaviour, their consumer 
habits, or their communicated fears. Simondon reiterates that, because they must over-
come their fears, single persons must resolve, as a tumultuous conflict within them, their 
inborn collective. Is this one of the reasons why so many today come together in ‘social’ 
networks, thus turning their innermost emotions outward?  
 Contemporary biologists likewise see themselves obliged, from a biodiversity per-
spective, to argue less in terms of single organisms than from vital interdependence-
contexts and diversity-fostering courses of development, and thus to expand the field of 
investigation. In view of environmental problems, there is an urgent need for an in-
creased co-incorporation of nonhuman agents and for granting them a not merely func-
tional right to exist in human contexts. Additionally, science theorists say we should take 
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into account the epistemological consequences of technological changes in observation 
processes by acknowledging that different results are produced depending on optical 
focus, timeframe, and the agents taken into account. Likewise, different ‘natural-cultural’ 
interrelationships are opened up, causing Bruno Latour (2010) to call for a ‘physical so-
ciology.’  
 In the biological realm, dividuation means the participation of different species in 
one another – viruses in human beings for example; these species are biologically divid-
ed according to conventional taxonomy, nonetheless they constitute a ‘self and same’ 
being which cannot be practically divided by risk of life. In the socio(techno)logical 
realm, it delineates culturally composite packs, culturally transversal commonalities, 
and new media co-operations, but, additionally, problematises fragmented and forced 
dividual identity formations. Dividuation, it can be stated at this point, simultaneously 
emphasises the epistemological and ethical gains resulting from the insight into global 
interdependencies and the necessity of sacrificing outdated self-identities, but also the 
dangers resulting from political or economic participation compulsions or identity-
oriented forced assignments.  
 In light of this, the epistemological motif of ‘undivided dividedness’ needs to be em-
phasised once more: single beings physically and psychically constitute themselves 
within a ‘continuum of division’ before they participate actively in that continuum and 
model themselves further through conjunction and disjunction of participations, 
through potentiation or disruption. Depending on the extent to which they succeed in 
joining their various modalities of participation, but also in retaining the openness of 
their mobility, rhythms, and further affections, they describe themselves as connected or 
isolated, or both at once. ‘Both at once’ is presumably the basic feeling most characteris-
tic of today’s human modes of existence: in spite of being connected to various 24-hour 
hotlines and through all kinds of ‘social media,’ and in spite of sharing with millions of 
other people the same place of residence, the same life practices and pieces of infor-
mation, not to mention sharing a physique and genetic code with an even greater num-
ber of others, even non-human ones, these modes of existence may experience them-
selves not just as spatially but also as affectively isolated, and as harshly separated from 
the social whole.  
 At the same time, it is precisely today that new possibilities are opening up for sin-
gle persons to connect and form transdividual socialities and affective condividuations: 
modes of communicative, action-oriented, multidirectional association. In themselves, 
these variously extensive socialities replicate the dividual structure, insofar as they re-
sult from different modes of participation, from the release of colligative wishes and fan-
tasies, on the one hand, and from polyphonic, consensus-oriented negotiations, on the 
other: negotiations that open up a problem area and are not necessarily liable to pro-
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duce decisions and actions. They can nevertheless merge, like a human megaphone, into 
a specific expression of affect that testifies to a particular tone, a new aesthetic quality, a 
recently invented form of cooperation, thereby assuming an epistemological and politi-
cal quality. The term used to refer to such affective-cognitive multiplicities, ‘condividua-
tion,’ is inspired by Gerald Raunig’s (2011) term ‘condivision.’ Raunig coined this term to 
refer to politically motivated, non-identitarian associations of particular multiplicities. 
The perspective of condividuation is also intended to draw attention to economic ine-
qualities of distribution and denied participation, serving as a reminder that the age of 
imposed participation and of the imperative to participate calls for the invention of new 
modes of dissident redistribution.  
 Processes of dividuation are also increasingly evident in the aesthetic and artistic 
realm, due both to technology-based practices and to the globalisation of the art scene, 
as well as to the close spatio-temporal cross-referencing of artistic positings, their quasi-
simultaneity of presentation and reception, their simultaneous presence at various ex-
hibition sites, and in different cultural contexts. As is well known, the uniqueness and 
authenticity of the artwork have, for some time, already been called into question due to 
the possibility of its mechanical reproduction, even if photographs and films attempt to 
newly auratise themselves by means of magnitude and spectacle. Self-reflexive artistic 
practices that are aware of their own historical and media-determined prestructured-
ness therefore increasingly rely on processes of dividuation, on procedures of repetition, 
appropriation, and modification, employing tactics of reframing and recontextualising in 
a manner ranging from the ironic to the provocative. Their specific engagement with 
their necessarily dividual constitution results from today’s mediatic processes of pro-
duction and distribution, but also from the simultaneous presentation of artworks in 
different exhibition contexts and the reciprocal reflection of those contexts.  
 In summary, my choice of the term dividuation (inspired by Deleuze’s use of the 
term ‘dividual’) amounts to a value judgement insofar as I emphasise certain features of 
single entities more than others: I stress their passive-active constitution over their au-
tonomous power, their ongoing division into diverse practices over the self-positing 
they perform through expressive acts, their division of capabilities over their specialisa-
tion, their interculturally diverse affections and mediatic interpassivities over their ac-
tive interaction. The concept of dividuation is intended to foreground unconceptualised 
relations of interpenetration between taxonomically and discursively distinct magni-
tudes, between human beings, microorganisms and non-human entities, social struc-
tures and their constitutive practices.  
 Dividuation describes a relationship to the self that is expanded to include passive 
dimensions. This perspective results from increased insight into the co-determinate na-
ture of human subjectivation in terms of greatly differing others, which imposes a new 
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task: not just that of being aware of participation, compulsions, and lures, but also of 
selecting, coordinating, and interrupting them. The multidirectional orientations and 
embeddings can be experienced as an increase in capabilities or a psychological strain 
and excessive distraction of attention; one must be aware of the challenges implicit in 
participation and moderate them ever more precisely. For dividual consciousness ulti-
mately demands that we understand the lateral ties as an opportunity for as yet un-
thought of (eco)policies, and that we resist unwanted appropriations through affirmed 
solidarisation with others. Comings-together of persons and groups may emerge in con-
dividuations: resistant ensembles that set themselves against the economic dividuations 
of major enterprises and databanks through various interruptions of appropriation or 
other condividual attitudes. It suggests the putting together of participation potentials in 
condividual ensembles that, as associations of divided intentions, abilities, and ideas, 
endeavour to combat techno-strategic appropriations by control forces as well as by 
epistemological curtailments, political exclusions, and eco(techno)logical over-
exploitation. With the term condividuation, lateral alliances, transversal capacity con-
nections, subversive knowledge communications, and new strategies of interrupting 
participation become thinkable.  
 Dividuation in this sense is not a normative term, but one coined to more adequately 
define contemporary participation processes – and intended to contribute to more com-
plex political understandings of the relationship between self and world. Against the 
associated, not unjustified fear of the loss of difference, it seems to me that one can still 
assert that every dividuation is different from every other one, owing to its own peculiar 
mode of participation, and always represents a peculiar virtual cohesion. I certainly 
would reserve the term ‘singularity’ for exceptional phenomena, as what this term really 
denotes is otherwise denied. It seems to me that all the various peculiar dividual cohe-
sions can be recorded in a sufficiently differential way in the term ‘particular.’ Epistemo-
logically, politically, and aesthetically, it remains desirable to accentuate differences be-
tween the dividuations, to work on differentiations, and to note from which perspective, 
with what framing, under consideration of which participation, according to which 
omission, and through which evaluation of single persons or groups any given structure 
or artwork can be recognised and acknowledged as specifically dividual and thus differ-
ent. Thus, one must pay attention to degrees, shadings, indeterminate affections, and 
peculiar participation mixes, and reveal those that are suited to a multifaceted, inclusive, 
and also significant form of participation in the process of world-becoming. 
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